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South Africa and the republics of the River Plate owed their development over the 
first two-thirds of the nineteenth century to the rapidly growing demand of industrial 
Europe for hides, wool, and other pastoral commodities. In each area the exchange of 
raw materials was managed by private merchants, generally organized in partnerships. 
Typically, these men were recruited from the hinterlands of the European ports. Sons 
of Leeds and Remscheid manufacturers, Glasgow and Hamburg merchants, they were often 
sent overseas as super-cargoes and formed an attachment with one of the houses with 
which they dealt, or else were despatched to join or set up a branch of an existing 
family firm. 
So long as land in the temperate zone of the southern hemisphere remained 
relatively cheap and the commodities it could produce dear, there was a great 
incentive for such merchants to invest in stock-breeding or viticulture, or merely to 
hold land for the rise in value effected by the slow but steady improvements in 
transport and credit facilities. So, while some retired to Europe after ten or twenty 
years in trade, contenting themselves thenceforward with seven or eight per cent on 
their money, a good many settled permanently at the Cape, in Buenos Aires, or on the 
Banda Oriental, where rates of return were substantially higher. 
In this way there came into being around each major colonial port a landed 
commercial community. They were distinguishable from older established elements in 
the ruling class by the extent of their commitment to trade; typically, in the second 
and third generations, land and office would assume greater relative importance. Also, 
they might be marked out by their port of origin: thus, those of the Buenos Aires 
community who arrived between the reglamento de comercio libre of 1778 and the French 
Wars were mostly Basques, Catalans, and Galicians; thereafter they were drawn from 
New England, Northern England, the Clyde, and North Germany. 
By the middle of the nineteenth century these commercial communities were a 
strong force. Linked by ties of credit, correspondence, and matrimoq with their 
principal business partners, often bankers and politicians as well as merchants and 
landowners, they were set to achieve a powerful if not a dominant voice in the 
government of their adopted countries. Together, they constituted a diasporic 
civilization of profound influence. (l) 
Inherent in this civilization was the means of its destruction. It had 
sprung from the North European revolution in metal and textile technology, a 
revolution which numbered amongst its intermediate consequences the advances in 
transport, communications, and business organization which made possible the efficient 
management from London or Paris of large-scale enterprises overseas, and had also 
accounted for the massive supplies of capital accumulated in Europe which were to 
respond to such schemes. 
The Joint Stock Companies Acts of 1858-62 opened new avenues for the 
investments of British funds overseas. To lend large sums to foreign governments, as 
London had been doing for half a century, had been to confirm the status quo in the 
recipient countrLes by fuelling the patronage system employed by the existing 
governments. Investment overseas by British-registered joint stock companies was 
quite a different matter, and far more socially disruptive. This was because the 
power of British companies was generally exercised by directors in London and their 
appointed officials : men outside the colonial (2) political structure, who were 
responsive to a wide range of market and non-market forces of which colonial political 
authorities and commercial communities were not always by any means the most important. 
From the presence of British-owned joint stock companies and their agents 
there developed a number of controversies. To whom should banks lend money? Was 
their business simply to finance long-distance trade, or ought they also to lend to 
rural entrepreneurs or to govermment, to assist in industrial development and infra- 
structure projects, or, at the very least, desist from interfering with those local 
banks which were prepared to undertake such tasks? How much of the premium income 
earned by British insurance companies in Argentina or South Africa should be invested 
there, and in what form? Should local insurance companies which invested all their 
funds in national development be favoured in law against the British giants? And 
ought the British to be permitted to fix rates for insurance business and exercise 
sanctions against colonial companies which tried to undercut them? Then again, who 
should control the rates charged by public utility companies? If the water, 
electricity and gas supplies, the tramway and telephone services, were owned by 
British and other foreign companies, ought they to have a free hand in deciding what 
to charge the public? These and m a n y  other questions were at issue between colonial 
governments and sections of the metropolitan bourgeoisie from the 1860s. 
How were these powers to meet? Work on Argentina suggests several 
possibilities for the articulation of this relationship, all of which involved members 
of the colonial commercial community acting in new roles. First, there is the stage, 
typical of the eazly years of many British overseas banks and mortgage companies, in 
which management was entrusted to members of the colonial commercial community, who 
applied local criteria in their lending policies, acting generously towards the larger 
local merchant houses and politicians. This caused little disruption at the colonial 
port (beyond encouraging speculation and over-trading) , but was a recipe for quick 
death in the City of London. Before long, therefore, the London directors of these 
companies took a firmer hand, replacing the first generation of managers by men who 
shared their own commercial mores, having been trained in English, German, or Scottish 
companies. The loss of expert local knowledge was commonly made good by the defection 
of a few influential members of the colonial commercial community to London to become 
professional compaq directors. 
This second stage in the development of Anglo-foreign joint stock companies 
was much more disruptive of _the colonial bourgeoisie. Many were alienated by the more 
aggressive stance now adopted towards them by the second generation of managers. Some 
went bankrupt. Some stuck to their guns and tried to manipulate the system to their 
own advantage, forging alliances with metropolitan financial powers to raise capital 
in Europe in the naive expectation that they would be able to retain managerial 
control. (3) Some looked to the local government for support. By contrast, a number 
made use of the new freedom of movement afforded by general limited liability to form 
their colonial landed interests into companies under professional managers, enabling 
them to become professional company directors in London. Alternatively, they might 
become mere rentiers in Bath or Biarritz, their investment portfolios diversified to 
the extent that they ceased to be identifiable with any one part of the world. These 
options,which had not been available to the generation of Cape and River Plate 
merchants which flourished in the first half of the nineteenth century, were now taken 
up by many of their sons. Nor should we exclude from this group those who remained in 
the colonial port acting as advisers, local directors, consulting lawyers or wire- 
pullers for the British companies, and whose continuity of residence should not conceal 
their realignment of loyalties. 
In short, the spread of joint stock organization drove a wedge into 
commercial communities in the principal states receiving British investment. What had 
formerly been a continuous cosmopolitan bourgeoisie constantly refreshed by 
international migration and marriage and with foci in all the principal ports now 
began to polarize into a number of discrete and self-contained national bourgeoisies 
on the defensive against a single metropolitan haute bourgeoisie centred upon London 
but with subordinates everywhere. 
Some of the strains resulting from the process of capitalist concentration 
and the attendant fragmentation of the commercial bourgeoisie were expressed in the 
political arena. Elements in the colonial commercial communities which had chosen to 
align themselves with the emergent colonial state were able to enlist support amongst 
the petit bourgeoisie and sections of the working class on bread-and-butter issues. 
The constituencies of the gas, water and electricity supply companies, the tramway and 
suburban railway companies (monopolies all), and the depositors of +he banks 
coincided to a marked degree with new and volatile sections of the colonial 
electorates. The employees of many of these companies were in the van of labour 
organization. Here, surely, in the grievances of a section of the electorate whose 
attachment to existing political leaders was no more than embryonic, could be seen a 
heaven-sent gift to the national bourgeoisie in its struggle against metropolitan 
capital. As if to be able to cry "monopoly" were not enough, they could cry "foreign 
monopoly", and point the finger at those of their political opponents who were 
implicated as local directors or legal advisers to the foreign capitalists in what 
could easily be portrayed as a cosmopolitan conspiracy. 
In the Orange Free State, local capitalists established the Bloemfontein 
Bank in 1862 and the Pauresmith Bank the following year: small affairs, each with a 
capital of £30,000. By the end of 1863, the second of these had been absorbed by the 
London-based Standard Bank of British South Africa. There was a certain amount of 
unpleasantness from the start, as it appeared probable -that the Standard Bank had 
achieved an extra-market advantage in its negotiations for the purchase of the 
Fauresmith Bank in the shape of co-operation from its cashier, Barret. (4) Over the 
next eighteen months complaints against the Standard Bank multiplied. The personal 
venality of Barret aroused discontent, but there were also more fundamental problems 
concerning relations between the Standard and its competitor, the Bloemfontein Bank. 
Large numbers of notes of the local bank were presented by the public to the various 
branches of the Standard Bank in the normal course of business. Naturally, they were 
sent to the Bloemfontein branch of the Standard, there to be presented for papnent. 
Whether the Standard actually went out of its way to collect these notes and present 
them in large q~i~ntities without warning in a deliberate effort to cripple their 
rival is essentially irrelevant. What matters is that the Orange Free State public 
preferred the Standardts notes to those of the local bank. When the Bloemfontein 
Bank's notes went down to the Cape to cover the Free State trade deficit, they came 
straight back up again. The notes of the Standard Bank, by contrast, remained in 
circulation. The point is that the manager of the Standard, be he never so well 
disposed towards his rival, could not avoid being seen as the man who stripped the 
Bloemfontein Bank of its specie reserves. He was, indeed, the proximate cause. 
Very soon, the Bloemfontein Bank was reduced to giving receipts for fixed 
deposits in favour of the Standard Bank bearing 10 per cent interest instead of gold 
in exchange for its own notes; and the interest pqnnents on these illusory deposits 
were a further drain on resources. 
Turning to Argentina and the we find a 
similar story. (5) The chief commerci ad served as 
financial centre for the Argentine Confederation during the secession of Buenos Aires 
from 1852 to 1862; in 1867, it put itself forward in all seriousness as a compromise 
site for the federal capital to replace Buenos Aires. !Pwo attempts to found banks in 
Rosario during the Confederate period failed. They were followed in the immediate 
aftermath of the reunification by a less ambitious and more successful attempt by the 
Spanish-born merchant Carlos Casado del Alisal. Casadols Banco de Rosario was soon 
acquired by Hexmy Green, Buenos Aires manager of the London and River Plate Bank and 
a former River Plate merchant, to serve as the foundation for a new branch of the 
London Bank. Green promised Casado a position as local director; however, head office 
refused to ratify the appointment, instead demanding Casadols signature to a document 
colrnnitting him not to engage in any banking activities in the future. There was 
unpleasantness, therefore, similar to that which had accompanied the entry of the 
Standard Bank into the Orange Free State; and the reappearance of Casado, in 1874, as 
the f omding chairman of a new, privileged Provincial Bank of Santa F6 (~anco 
Provincial de Santa FQ) in June 1874 did nothing to lessen the tension. 
A war ensued between the two banks, remarkably similar to that which had 
been waged, some years previously, between the Standard Bank and its competitor. The 
Government of Santa FQ, and many of the local landowners who collectively constituted 
that government, had been happy enough to greet the London and River Plate Bank on its 
arrival in 1866 and had seen the Banco Casado swallowed up with few regrets. They 
thought that the new institution would provide them with plentiful credit on good 
terms for the improvement of their estates. But this was not what the Bank had in 
mind. On the contrary, under the chairmanship of George Drabble, a former River Plate 
merchant, the London board expressly forbade loans on mortgage, however wealthy or 
reputable the client. In spite of the evident desire of their branch manager to 
accommodate his customers, the board remained adamant. (6) Inevitably, this policy, 
and especially the inconsistency of policy between the London board and their local 
maaager, resulted in a good deal of ill-feeling against the Bank on the part of the 
local comrnuni-ty-. They felt that they had been led on with false promises and then 
slapped in the face; and so in a sense they had been, for the opening of the branch 
at the height of a boom in 1866 was soon followed by retrenchment in the aftermath of 
the Overend Gumey crisis, compounding the swing from local to London lending criteria. 
Outof this situation arose the state-sponsored Provincial Bank: a last- 
ditch attempt by local businessmen to retain an independent source of credit. The 
government went so far as to transfer to the new institution some of the privileges 
they had earlier ceded to the London Bank, notably the right to issue notes. The 
London Bads managers in Buenos Aires and Rosario regarded this as the last straw in a 
policy of aggravation which had begun with the establishment of the rival bank. To 
them it was Ifyet another proof of the desire entertained on the part of the natives, 
and those composing the governments of this country, to hostilize the foreign banking 
institutions established here as much as possible". (7) 
As in Bloemfontein, the imperial bank responded to these attempts to 
diminish its privileges and to the deteriorating general condition of the economy by 
steadfastly refusing to hold the notes of its rival. Furthermore, local deposits, . 
showing little loyalty to the cause of the provincial government, began to seek safety 
in the foreign bank, fearing a declaration of forced currency. 
The London Bank continued to fight the policy of the provincial government 
in the courts as well as the counting house. The case went to the Supreme Court, but 
althow well prepared legally the London Bank simply lacked the political weight 
needed to win such a suit, and it went against them. (8) The provincial authorities 
responded by ordering the liquidation of the Rosario branch of the London Bank, hoping 
that, rather than lose their entire business in the province, the board of directors 
in London might admit to a compromise and be persuaded to merge with the Santa F6 Bank, 
or at least to assist it extensively. (9) 
The bluff, if that was what it was, did not work. George Drabble, chairman 
of the London Bank, complied with the liquidation order, possibly reckoning that the 
Santa F6 Bank would fail in any case and the government be obliged to ask the British 
to return with their original rights restored or even improved. (10) What might have 
happened if the Provincial Bank had been content aYld able to ride out the crisis without 
outside assistance it is impossible to say. As it was, the provincial authorities 
overstepped the mark in June 1876 by abducting the gold reserves of the London Bank and 
briefly imprisoning its manager, (11) This use of physical coercion brought the 
reluctant and tentative involvement of the national government and the British foreign 
office. The outcome was that the provincial government was eventually obliged to 
countenance the continued existence of the London Bank in Rosario, the national 
government making good the funds that had been abstracted. In short, the survival of 
the Provincial Bank was ensured by means of a forced loan levied on the London Bank 
and later repaid by the national authorities. 
The manner in which the two pairs of banks competed - one in Rosario, the 
other in Bloemfontein - was largely due to their geographical circumstances. In so 
isolated a situation, whichever of any two banks was found to command the greater 
public confidence at a time of general uncertainty was bound, in the event of there 
being a convertible paper currency, to receive large numbers of its rival's notes for 
conversion into metal or more trusted notes. So it was the banking public - a body 
not so very different in composition from the governing class - which decided the fate 
of the local bank in each case. For once the foreign bank concerned. had received large 
quantities of its competitor's notes, it was bound, for the security of its depositors 
and shareholders, to present them for conversion as soon as possible, rather than run 
the risk of their being declared inconvertible, as was to happen in Rosario in the 
winter of 1876. 
What, though, of the political reaction to this free-market competition? In 
Rosario, as we have seen, the provincial government eventually resorted to force. 
There is no space to go deeply into the details of the incident here. Suffice it to 
say that coercion was unnecessary, and was almost certainly greeted with dismay by the 
provincial finance minister and the governor. The problem had been on the verge of 
solution through a loan from the London Bank to the Provincial Bank on the very day 
that the police chief of Rosario and his men took the bullion. 
Equally strong was the reaction to the policy of the Standard Bank in 
Bloemfontein. There, as in Rosario, the local institution was obliged to seek the 
assistance of government in the form of a decree authorizing the issue of inconvertible 
legal tender notes. These became known as bluebacks. As in Rosario, local bank and 
local government shared an interpretation of the morality of the affair wholly 
different from that of the foreigners. The Standard Bank simply saw that it had 
competed with another commercial institution and won. The Volksraad, by contrast, 
declared that tlunless similar 'Foreign Banking Institutions' are henceforth forbidden 
here, the entire people will by degrees fall under the power and become dependent upon 
foreign capitalists1', and resolved that they would forbid absolutely the operation of 
such banks throughout the republic. (12) So it was that the Standard Bank of South 
Africa finally withdrew from the Orange Free State in 1868, not to return until after 
the annexation of 1900. The boers, it appeared, had been confirmed in their original 
opinion that joint stock banks were "a gigantic swindlew. (13) So, too, in Santa FQ, 
a province with a long-standing grudge against over-mighty Buenos Aires and all it 
stood for, xenophobia came very naturally. In an open letter to the provincial 
attorney general written a few W s  after the bullion had been taken from the London 
Bank, Servando Bayo, Governor of Santa F6, accused the London Bank of being responsible 
for the current economic depression. The bank, he asserted, had withdrawn gold from 
the province "for the enrichment of a foreign market, under the pretext of rendering 
miserable and dearly bought servicesst. And Bayo went further, accusing the Bank of 
"hostility, persistent and constant, against every banking institution until the 
attainment of the discredit, the annihilation and disappearance thereof, in order to 
create a monopoly which would leave the entire commerce of the province at its 
mercyn. (14) The rhetoric is familiar; it is the universal voice of economic 
nationalism. The local governing class, seeking a scapegoat for the effects of world- 
wide recession, finds it in the institutions of foreign capitalism. At such times they 
are themselves, as members or affiliates of the local commercial c o d t y  (15), under 
grave pressure: a pressure exerted through foreign fixms threatening to withdraw 
credits and to take over or simply drive out of business local institutions which 
have grown out of the preceding boom. How easy, then, to identify the vehicle of 
recession with its cause, and direct personal and public discontent over unemployment, 
bank failures, and other symptoms of depression, towards foreign institutions? 
One last point about Rosario and. Bloemfontein banking crises: whereas the 
Standard Bank was kept out of the Orange Free State until 1900, the London Bank was 
able to keep its Rosario Branch, and lost only the right to issue notes. Two 
essentially sirnilar incidents had very different outcomes because of the very 
different political contexts within which they took place. For, whilst the British 
government could do nothing in either case, there was the additional intermediary 
resource in the Rosario affair of the Axgentine national government in Buenos Aires. 
There, press and government were appalled by the behaviour of Bayo. La Tribuna l 
declared that "the unprecedented proceedings of the Government of Santa F6 show all 
the aggravating characteristics that raake them most degrading to the dignity of a 
civilized peopleu; La Nacibn and La Rep6blica expressed similar opinions. (16) 
President Avellaneda and two members of his national government - Lucas Gonzalez, the 
Minister of Finance, and Simdn de Iriondo, Bayofs predecessor as governor of Santa F6 - 
all addressed semi-public letters to Bayo deploring the treatment meted out to the 
I 
London Bank. (17) It was an expression of the recurrent conflict between civilized 
city and barbaric camp. (18) And there was need for the national government to step 
l 
warily, since, as we have seen, the issue was still a live me: the caudillo Lbpez 
Jordan not yet finally defeated, Buenos Aires not yet federalized. Indeed, the 
British minister in Buenos Aires believed that the national government was too weak to 
coerce the government of Santa F6 into making restitution, and that any attempt to do 
so would bring out the province in support of the rising apprehended in Entre Rios. (19) 
This was at the beginning of June. At the end of the month, following the seizure of 
the London Bank bullion, the Minister again gave voice to his pessimism concerning the 
future of the republic. "The actual state of affairs in this Republic is most 
precarious", he wrote, "and in view of a possible dissolution of the Argentine 
Confederation, I can scarcely expect that the Government will adopt, even if able to 
carry it out, aqr measure of coercing a powerful and disaffected province for the 
satisfaction of the aggrieved subjects of a foreign country." (20) In retrospect, this 
view may easily appear too pessimistic; at the time it was a realistic appraisal of 
the situation. All the more remarkable, therefore, that the national government should 
have done as much as they did on behalf of the London Bank. Yet not as remarkable as 
all that, for Gomalez was a founder of the British-registered Buenos Aires and 
Ensenada Railway Company Limited (21), whilst Iriondo, for his part, very probably had 
already an eye to the next gubernatorial elections, when he hoped to oust Bayo. Sure 
enough, in January 1878, he called at the Buenos Aires office of the London Bank to 
ask for an advance of $5,000. Smithers, the manager, considered it best to grant the 
request even though, as he put it, "it is just possible we may never get the money 
back". (22) In &rch, Ir::Londo was back for mow. Smithers wrote: Ifwe are sorry to 
say we have had another demand for money from this man.... We can only hope that once 
in power Dr Iriondo will not forget these services .l1 (23) He did,of course. 
The point of all this is a simple one, namely that the web of relations 
between the City of London, the Argentine national governgent, the local offices of 
British compmies, and the provincial authorities was of consistent texture, W e n  
under stress, things never got out of hand to the point where excessive coercion or a 
prolonged break in relations ensued. So when, after 1890, the build up of 
resentment againat imports of British capital reached danger point, it expressed 
itself in Argentina as a powerful aYld widespread minority feeling which would grow 
into a broad national political movement of a mildly populist character. In South 
Africa, by contrast, it was concentrated geographically by the endurance of the Boer 
Republics as separate political entities, a situation exacerbated by the spatial 
concentration of the mining industry. These two factors reinforced each other, 
contrasting strongly with the more dispersed character of the principal Argentine 
industries: stock raising and cereal production. To put it another way, the tension 
between the pro-foreign-capital majority of the Argentine ruling class and the anti- 
foreign-capital minority was expressed and worked out without resort to civil war at 
least partly because the socio-economic crises of 1890-93 and 1913-17 followed nearly 
half a century of careful internal diplomacy, interspersed with armed confrontation, 
and all aimed at evening out the conflicts between coast and interior. The British, 
for their part, constantly impeded by imperial considerations, had been far less 
successful in creating a.politica1 and constitutional environment in South Africa into 
which the large-scale export of British capital could safely intrude. 
It would be specious to attempt to reach firm conclusions on the basis of a 
schematized account of the transition from commercial to corporate capitalism and a 
comparison between two incidents in the history of banking 
l 
1 
The Rosario and Bloemfontein incidents illustrate a few of the generalizations 
made in the earlier part of this paper, it is true. In both instances, initial 
l optimism in the colonial community about the likely effects of opening a branch of an 
I imperial bank were pretty soon dispelled by managerial incompetence and partiality, 
I board intransigence, and the impersonal and ineluctable process of competition and 1 concentration of capitals. When indigenous institutions were threatened, their owners 
quickly aligned themelves with local government authorities in an attempt to fight 
I back against the metropolitan connexion, enlisting support from elements in the local 
population by the use of provincialist, anti-capitalist rhetoric. 
contention is these phenomena are endemic to the economies of the newly 
settled temperate 1a.nds of the nineteenth century. The particular pattern of 
circumstances and events which characterized Rosario or Bloemfontein was, of course, 
quite distinct from that to be found in the more cosmopolitan cities of Cape Town or 
Buenos Aires. To that extent the incidents described here are of marginal significance 
and any generalizations they may suggest of limited application. But the general 
themes of distance and its effects upon hierarchical institutions, the clash of 
metropolitan lending criteria and provincial credit requirements, and the relation of 
provincial or national bourgeoisies with their local governmental authorities aJnd with 
metropolitan capital are all matters of perennial interest on which the records of 
business firms may shed a particularly revealing light in those all-too-rare instances 
where they have survived. 
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